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On Rhetoric as Gift/Giving
Marilee Mifsud

In this essay, I explore the possibilities of rhetoric as gift. I begin with the Homeric gift economy and the rhetorical resources of this economy.1 My use of
“economy” here is not reducible to a monetary exchange system, but rather a
more general system of practices orchestrating cultural identity and relations.
As Georges Bataille suggests, studying a general economy may hold the key to
all the problems posed by every discipline (1991, 10). For Bataille everything
from geophysics to political economy, by way of sociology, history, and biology,
to psychology, philosophy, art, literature, and poetry has an essential connection with economy. So, too, rhetoric. Henry Johnstone once defined rhetoric
as the art of getting attention (1990, 334). We cannot attend to everything at
once, so something must call our attention, invite our focus, and this something
is rhetoric. Rhetoric’s desire to dispose its audience to invest in the object of
attention connects rhetoric to economy. Rhetoric can be said to enact a disposition to invest, or a cathexis, a certain kind of savings. As such it is subject to
economic movements and displacements, a dimension seen as well through
Lyotard’s figure of the dispositif (1993, x).
My use of “gift” here draws broadly from work in anthropology and
philosophy on “the gift” starting with Marcel Mauss’s groundbreaking anthropological work on archaic gift cultures. Mauss argues that as far back as we can
go in the history of human civilizations, the major transfer of goods has been
by cycles of gift-exchange. Each gift is part of a system of reciprocity in which
the honor of the giver and recipient are engaged. That every gift must be met
with a return gift, even if delayed, sets up a perpetual cycle of exchanges within
and between cultures. In some cycles the return is equal to the gift, producing
stable systems. However, in some cycles the return exceeds the gift. Such excess
creates a competitive generosity, an escalating contest for honor. Mauss’s work
shows there are no free gifts: a gift economy creates for members permanent
commitments that articulate the dominant institutions of law, politics, culture, and
interpersonal relations. The theory of the gift is a theory of human solidarity.
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2007.
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From Mauss, the gift has taken off as a subject not only of sociological
and anthropological interest, but of philosophical. Alan Schrift makes the case
that the theme of the gift is located at the center of current discussions of postmodernity, discussions ranging from deconstruction, to gender, to ethics. The
gift is, as Schrift argues, “one of the primary focal points at which contemporary
disciplinary and interdisciplinary discourses intersect” (1997, 3). As a sampling,
and an insight into theories of the gift underwriting this essay, consider the encounters Bataille, Derrida, and Cixous have with the gift. Bataille encounters
the distinction between restrictive and general economies, and theorizes general
economy through an economic logic based on the unproductive expenditure of
excess associated with gift cultures. Derrida encounters the impossibility of the
gift, that is, once a gift is recognized as gift, it is no longer a gift but an obligation demanding reciprocity. Hélène Cixous encounters the difference between
masculine and feminine economies in terms of the latter creating relations with
others through gift-giving where the gift does not calculate its influence.
My exploration of the archaic Homeric gift economy takes me eventually to explore what such postmodern theories of the gift offer rhetoric, but not
before moving through the classical Athenian polis economy. In the Western
tradition, the polis is a familiar economy. For the most part, this familiarity arises
because of the marketplace and state structure of the polis, so familiar still in
modern capitalism. However, in particular regard to the study of rhetoric, this
familiarity arises from the historical claim that the polis invented rhetoric as
an idea and practice of serving its needs (e.g., arguing in the public assembly
about the administration of the state, in the courtrooms to administer justice,
and in the agora to proclaim and persuade the values of the culture). The polis
has become so familiar as the economy of the Western tradition, and the situation of exchange in which rhetoric takes place, that it has become normalized.
This normalization makes the polis economy visible only as the economy, rather
than as a particular form of economy. This normalization masks a more archaic
past where gifts not markets, and people not entities, regulate cultural economy,
including rhetoric.
When the Homeric gift economy is taken as the starting point for theorizing rhetoric, the Athenian polis and its rhetoric seem alien and strange, not
at all “normal.” Just as the Homeric Greeks are aliens to the Athenian Greeks
and vice versa, so too the gift economy is alien to the polis economy and vice
versa. The two economies are not only alien, but incommensurable. Drawing
from Paul Feyerabend, I posit incommensurability as a means by which to
articulate cultural alterity. This creates an orientation of distinction between
these economies, where the alien is both between and within each economy.
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Such an orientation works to resist trading a relation of difference for a regime
of domination.2 Moreover, such an orientation allows the relation of difference
to be generative of directions beyond these incommensurable economies.
My approach in this essay is not so much, if at all, about history, and getting it right, or rescuing its lost virtues. My approach is, in Deleuzian terms, a
becoming, that belongs to geography, not history. Becomings are “orientations,
directions, entries and exits” (1987, 2). Deleuze writes of a woman-becoming
that is not the same as women, their past, and their future, but that is essential
for women to enter to get out of their past and their future, their history (2).
Likewise, there is a philosophy-becoming that has nothing to do with the history
of philosophy and that happens through those whom the history of philosophy
does not manage to classify (2). And, I add, there is, too, a rhetoric-becoming
that has nothing to do with the history of rhetoric, and that happens through
those whom the history of rhetoric does not manage to classify. Such is Homer
to me in rhetoric. Yet, as we shall see, Homer is not a savior. Rather, exploring
Homeric gift economy and rhetoric offers an experience of alterity. What Cixous calls a sortie and Deleuze a becoming opens in the rub between the archaic
gift and the classical polis. This opening allows for rhetoric becoming, not so
much gift, but giving.

Homeric Gift Economy
The Homeric gift economy is situated in the home: the oikos.3 The same could
be said of all economy, for oikos is the root of “economy.” In the Homeric gift
economy, we see how the home serves as the space of cultural orchestration.
The aorist passive, middle sense of the verb oikew (to live) means, of a people,
to settle, organize or dispose themselves. This disposition gives rise to the Homeric economy, the systems of exchange, both material and symbolic, by which
a people dispose themselves.
The dynamism between the home and the disposition of a people shows
the significance of hospitality in Homeric economy. Archaic hospitality, the
virtue of being a host to a guest in the home, or vice versa, generates the obligation of friendship and solidarity, as well as the acquisition and amplification
of honor within and between peoples. Hospitality involves the xenos, meaning
both guest and host. That the term xenos is one of Zeus’s epithets marks the
particularly sacred association of guest-host relations, and signals the significance of hospitality rituals.
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Homeric depictions of hospitality rituals are lavish. In the Odyssey,
Odysseus’s arrival at the palace of Alkinoös, King of the Phaiakians, presents
such an occasion for Homer to tell the details of greeting a guest, welcoming
him as a stranger with guest gifts, offering to him a feast, and the occasion for
story telling, as well as preparing a splendid departure for the guest, with more
guest gifts, another feast, and still more occasions for the exchange of speeches.
Whereas action generally passes quickly in Homer, the story of Alkinoös’ hospitality and guest-friendship offered to Odysseus spreads from Book 8–13, a
remarkable dedication to the details and dynamics of gift-exchange.
Details of the luxurious items exchanged during hospitality rituals abound
as well: silver, gold, tunics, fine fabrics, wines, cauldrons, baskets, mixing bowls,
tripods, decorated armor, and swords. Homer tells of the gifts given to Helen
and Menelaus from the King and Queen of Egypt: the silver work-basket with
wheels underneath, edged in gold, to hold yarn for spinning, a golden distaff with
dark-colored wool, two silver bathtubs, a pair of tripods, and ten talents of gold
(Od. 4.125–35). We are told as well of the gifts of the Phaiakians to Odysseus:
the surpassingly beautiful tripods and caldrons, the intricately wrought gold,
and all the fine woven clothing (13.217–18) that the Phaiakian men of counsel
gave to Odysseus, man by man, to create a most generous collection of treasure
(13.7–15). Menelaus gives to Telemachus, not utilitarian gifts, but the single
most precious gift in his storehouse of treasure, a silver fashioned mixing bowl,
edged in gold, made by the god Hephaestus (4.615–17).
The luxury of the gifts and the liberality of hospitality rituals portray in
the orchestration of relations in and between peoples a competitive generosity. Competitive generosity directs the Homeric gift economy. Menelaus must
bestow precious treasure on Telemachus not only to establish his honor, but to
communicate to Telemachus the deep bond, the solidarity, he feels for Odysseus
(4.612–19). The elaborate hospitality of the Phaiakians not only ensures their
honor in the moment with their guest, but that their honor transcends the moment
into the future as Odysseus will tell great stories of them upon his return to his
homeland. Generosity is the primary means by which characters acquire and
sustain honor, as well as create a network of obligations to each other that can
carry this honor into the future, and to many different peoples. This network of
obligations creates solidarity both within and between cultures, and this solidarity engenders trust. One who expends his surplus so liberally by giving feasts
and treasure is not only honorable, but trustworthy.
The Homeric gift economy is situated in the home, structured through
norms of hospitality, the highest of these being generosity, and directed toward
creating the obligations of friendship and solidarity, as wells as acquiring honor.
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This does not mean, however, that the gift is always a friendly economy. Examples abound of the gift being a source of trickery and enmity, as is the case
with the infamous Trojan horse, given in the guise of a luxurious hospitality
gift to the Trojans. That such examples exist does not, however, undermine the
structure of the gift economy through hospitality rituals. The Trojans were obligated to receive the lavish horse as a gift because of the norms of gift cultures.
How else could they have been so duped?
Of note in this sketch of the Homeric gift economy are the inextricable
relations between public and private, and between persons and things. First,
no radical separation between the public and the private makes sense in the
Homeric world. Even in what might be considered the public world of Homeric
men (assembling in the Iliad to orchestrate war, or in the Odyssey to orchestrate
the return of a hero and the security of the hero’s kingdom), private rituals of
guest-host relating, friendship, and gift-giving structure the public assembly.
Moreover, the site of the assembly is often the home, the palace of the King.
This private space in which the public disposes itself connects the public to the
intimate, as do the private rituals of hospitality.
The intimacy of the gift economy inextricably links the person and the
private to the public. Moreover, this intimacy links the person to the thing, and
vice versa, creating an animistic quality to the gift. The power of the gift is,
in Maussian terms, a laying hold of both persons and things. In gift cultures,
no absolute boundary between persons and things can be drawn. No radical
separation exists between the two. Things are an extension of persons, and
people identify with the things possessed and exchanged. Mauss describes
worlds where the relation between persons and things is one between souls,
because the thing itself possesses a soul (2000, 12). To make a gift of something
to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself (12), hence the thing
given is not inactive. The thing is intimately connected to the person, hence it
is invested with life (13).
A gift economy is an intimate economy, where things have not yet become distant, abstract, objectified commodities, and acts of exchange between
people have not yet become less about the people and more about the things.
In the gift economy, things and people imitate each other, as do the private and
public. Things represent and portray the people who give them, and vice versa.
The private represents and portrays the public, and vice versa. Hence things
and people, and the private and public, in a gift economy are mimetic: they
represent or portray one another. Their mimesis allows for the gift “to be less
an entity or object than a matrix of relations” (Naas 1995, 150). “Entities” or
“objects” can be treated as independent analytic units. A kind of abstraction and
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distance figures their being. The gift as “a matrix of relations” resists treatment
via analysis of isolated parts as independent of the whole, or of inanimate objects
to be exchanged, or of public assembly divorced of private rituals of hospitality.
Not only does the gift as thing represent or portray the person as giver, and vice
versa, but it represents and portrays the past as present and the present as past,
thus constituting the future out of both simultaneously. Gifts always bear the
traces of others, and of the past. Gifts link generations to each other, representing or portraying not so much a present value as the figure of past and future
relations. Hence, the significance of gifts lies not so much in their material worth
as in their creation of cultural intimacy and cultural memory.
The consciousness required for such intimacy and memory is a consciousness of aggregation, not division. Aggregation guides relations in the gift
economy. Archaic aggregation is a product of archaic paratactic consciousness
and speech. Parataxis is a style of thought and speech that holds multiple related
and divergent things in mind simultaneously, not “as one unified entity” but “as
ones in the aggregate” (Feyerabend 1975, 179–180n.51).
We can see how parataxis stylizes ideas in and through aggregation in
the following passage from the Odyssey:
We came next to the Aiolian island, where Aiolos
lived, Hippotas’ son, beloved by the immortal
gods, on a floating island, the whole enclosed by a rampart
of bronze, not to be broken, and the sheer of the cliff runs upward
to it; and twelve children were born to him in his palace,
six of them daughters, and six sons in the pride of their youth, so
he bestowed his daughters on his sons, to be their consorts.
And evermore, beside their dear father and gracious mother,
they feast, and good things beyond number are set before them;
and all their days the house fragrant with food echoes
in the courtyard, and their nights they sleep each one by his modest wife,
under coverlets, and on bedsteads corded for bedding. (10.1–13)

In this passage, we encounter paratactic style: the presence of grammatically co-ordinate propositions fashioned through “and,” and in place of “and,”
the comma. We can see as well the absence of logically subordinating connectors
such as “then” and “because.” The aggregate quality of parataxis parallels the
absence of elaborate systems of subordinate clauses in the early Greek language.
This absence of subordination in Homeric language as well as style displays a
simultaneity operating in archaic rhetoric, where many and multiple ideas can
be strung together, to proliferate meaning and connection. In the passage cited
above, a rhetorical intimacy can be experienced where the detail of the corded
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bedsteads is as significant to the passage’s offerings as the details of sleeping
under coverlets, being given over to one’s siblings in marriage, and feasting all
one’s days in the courtyard of one’s family home. In the multiplicity in unity,
minority ideas are equalized with majority, allowing for a liberality to meaning
not offered by majority rule.
A paratactic consciousness allows for aggregation, and in turn allows, as
archaic mimetic consciousness allows, cultural intimacy and memory. Multiple
and divergent things can be seen as touching. The possibilities of connection
proliferate. One thing cannot be thought without simultaneously thinking of
some digressively incidental thought (Feyerabend 1975, 179–80n.51). An
intimacy emerges in parataxis. In the process of simultaneously entertaining
a digression with the thought that sparked it, we experience a connection and
connectedness and both particular and general awareness of our situation. This
intimacy forges a cultural memory of general relations, a memory that is everpresent yet always becoming.
Cultural intimacy and memory work within a general economy. In Bataillean terms, with an orientation toward a general economy, exchange cannot be
studied in isolation as an independent act, or as collection of independent acts all
coordinated to perform a specific end. Bataille writes that when it is necessary
to change a car tire, it is easy to manage a quite limited operation. It is possible
to act as if the elements on which the action is brought to bear are completely
isolated from the rest of the world. One can complete the operation without once
needing to consider the whole, of which the tire is an integral part (1991, 19).
Bataille considers the whole, general economy at play—not just the particular
operations of the changing of a tire but the more general economy that expands
even to the production of cars. The changes brought about do not perceptibly alter
the other things, nor does the ceaseless action from without have an appreciable
effect on the conduct of the operation. However, something changes when the
question becomes that of economic activity in general. A certain kind of intimacy
and memory are at work in general economy—an intimacy where elements on
which action is brought to bear are not completely isolated from the rest of the
world, but are brought into contact with it—and a memory is forged of general
relations, not merely of operations, at play in any cultural activity. The gift is
not a series of technical operations, nor an exchange of entities and objects as
inanimate things. Nor is the gift a private ritual separate from the public. The
gift is an economy of intimacy and memory, where exchange wrought from
hospitality structures cultural identity and relations.
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Polis Economy
The polis transfigures exchange to meet the needs of the nation-state, an idea
wholly alien to the Homeric Greeks. A striking portrayal of the transfiguration
of exchange in the polis economy can be found on the Temple of Hephaestus,
looming directly above the bouleterion, on the crowning hill of the agora.4
Decorating the face of the temple is a configuration of the labors of Heracles.
This configuration is quite different from the mythic tales of the labors. On the
temple, the labors are organized differently, some are excluded, one is included
twice, and one offers a different portrayal altogether of a labor from the mythic
portrayal. This different portrayal is of Heracles giving the golden apples of the
Hesperides to Athene. Moved to the climactic metope on the frieze of the temple’s
face (in the myth this is Heracles’s eleventh labor; in the temple frieze it is his
twelfth and final labor), this portrayal signals the transfiguration of exchange
from the gift economy to the polis economy. In this climactic metope, we see
Heracles wearing the impenetrable pelt of the Nemean Lion, whom he killed
for its magical protective skin. He has other objects around him, perhaps the
other commodities he secured in various labors. He has in his hands the golden
apples of the Hesperides, which he cunningly stole from Atlas. He is giving
these apples to Athene, who in turn gives him an olive branch.
That Heracles’s gift of the apples is not an extension of himself, but rather
a yield from his labor, is significant. The apples are actually things intimately
connected not to Heracles but to the Hesperides. That Heracles was not given
them as a gift, that rather he secured them through trickery as a commodity that
would fashion a favorable future for Athens (not the Hesperides), is significant.
That the impenetrable skin that Heracles flays and uses for his own protection
is intimately of the Nemean Lion not of Heracles, yet the Nemean Lion is not
the giver of its own skin, is significant. The significance of all this lies in the
distance between the gift and the giver, the abstraction of the thing from the
person, which in turn creates a commodity out of the apples, and of the Lion’s
skin, and a trader (traitor?) out of Heracles for putting these commodities in
circulation for the benefit of the Athenian polis, a benefit wrought from the
robbing and murder of the proper givers.
That the metope tells a different story than the myth, too, is significant. In
the myth, Heracles tries to give the apples first to Eurystheus, who hands them
back to him; then to Athene, who returns them to the Hesperides, the nymphs
who tended and protected Hera’s orchard, making them the proper givers. Some
tellings of the myth hold that Athena was angry with Heracles’s offer as it was
an affront to gift exchange. In the metope, we see none of this. Gift exchange
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is transfigured from the myth to the metope. In the metope, the apples are not a
gift, but a commodity, exchanged for the good of the state. Moreover, Athena’s
participation in this exchange, as depicted in the metope, sanctions the exchange.
In the myth, Athena’s rejection of the apples as a gift marks the wrongfulness of
the exchange of “gifts” figured as such. In the metope, this kind of exchange is
not only depicted as right, but as requisite for Athenian peace and prosperity.
The practice of exchange as depicted in this final metope of the labors of
Heracles on the Temple of Hephaestus spirits exchange in the agora and bouleterian in particular kinds of ways, in and through relational distance, abstraction, commodification, technical operation/procedure, and utility. This spirit of
exchange expresses itself in actual practices of the polis, such as ostracization,
liturgy, and antidosis. These practices of the polis present figures of exchange
in a polis economy.
First let’s consider the practice of ostracization. When the last tyrant,
Peisistratus, was driven from Athens, Athenian citizens were left to create
a system of rule appropriate to freedom, not only in political situations but
economic too. The tyrant, after all, was likely as hated for his accumulation of
wealth and resources as his despotism, not that these two are necessarily separate
phenomena. We see evidence of the suspicion of over-accumulation of resources
in the ancient practice of ostracization. This practice came into favor in the early
years of the polis and continued through the fall of Athens. Whenever a citizen
began to amass too much—too much wealth, too much loyalty, too much social
status—anyone perceiving this excess as a threat to the polis could call for a vote
of ostraka. The council would gather. Speeches would be made about the threat
of the man who had accumulated such great wealth and resources, and on pottery
shards, or ostraka, councilmen would scratch the name of the person feared to
have accumulated too much. If five hundred ostraka were cast, the citizen in
excess would be ostracized for a period of seven years. Seven years was thought
to be sufficient for the destruction and redistribution of one’s excess so upon
re-entry to the polis the once overly accumulated citizen would be appropriately
reduced to the norm, or even below. Over-accumulation happens because the
over-accumulator never gives anything away; he has no competitive generosity.
Rather, he hoards, in a spirit of generous competitiveness. Ostracization worked
as a state mechanism to force the exchange process when members of the polis
economy felt no obligation to keep wealth in circulation.
Another such practice illuminating the transfiguration of exchange in
the polis economy is the practice of antidosis. Literally “a giving in exchange,”
antidosis was a practice of the newly developing Athenian democracy. The practice came about when a man wished to avoid his duty of performing a liturgy.
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Liturgies were related either to the army or to the state. The trierarchy (ship
keeping) was an “extraordinary liturgy” directly related to wartime. “Ordinary
liturgies” comprised such acts as theatre sponsorship, running the gymnasia,
providing civic meals, and horse-breeding. A liturgy is a practice of taxation that
transfigures the gift through the mechanism of a state apparatus. The liturgy, in
theory, was to inspire pride in the Athenian taxpayer, for it placed his estate at
the service of his city. The practice called for the wealthiest Athenian men to
come forward to carry out various services for the good of their polis in the best
possible fashion. They were to get out of it notability and self-respect. Yet, the
liturgy, because of expense and responsibility, could be received as a compulsory
act that some might want to avoid performing. A man who was nominated to
perform a liturgy could avoid this duty if he could name another citizen who
was richer and better qualified to perform the task, in effect, shifting the burden
of hospitality to another. If the man challenged agreed that he was richer, he had
to take over the liturgy; if he claimed to be poorer, then the challenger could
insist on an exchange of all their property to test the claim in which case the
challenger would himself perform the liturgy as the new owner of the supposed
greater estate. This process of exchange was called antidosis.
The advantage of antidosis and ostracization as formal systems from the
viewpoint of the democracy was that they encouraged the rich to be suspicious
of each other, instead of being hostile toward the state. In both the practice of
ostracization and antidosis, we can see how suspicion structures citizen relations.
This is not to say that members of the gift economy did not also get suspicious
of each other. They certainly did. We know well, for example, that the Iliad is as
much a story of Achilles’ suspicion of Agamemnon as it is a story of the Trojan
War. Yet, the gift economy did not have a state mechanism constructing operations that formalize suspicion as an orientation toward others. The distinctness
of the gift economy, as it structures relations through rituals of hospitality, is
not that of technical operations formalizing suspicion. The state cultivation of
suspicion works as a safeguard against tyranny, but it works against cultural
intimacy and memory.
The polis economy transfigures exchange to meet the needs of the nation-state. The transfiguration works through positioning people and things
differently. Relative to the gift culture, things and people in a polis culture are
related through distant, abstract mechanisms of power, rather than personal
relations, and through technical proceduralism and utility, more so than through
relational obligations, luxury, and honor.
In terms of cultural memory, exchange in a polis economy spirits the
future, using the present and the past as means to a desired end. The conflu-
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ence of past and present brought forward in memory creates points of closure
from which the future can be built. These points of closure prevent memory of
peoples and cultures as givers prior to the point at which the gift is transfigured
into the commodity. Polis exchange operates in and through distance and commodification. Things are distant—by this I mean non-intimate—from people,
and people distant from things. Things become means or tools to be used by
people—a use governed by techne. Technics overwhelms mimetics. And in
the technic culture, intimacy and memory suffer. How intimate is a techne? In
what way memorable? In technics, intimacy is transfigured into fetishism—as
when Heracles wraps himself in the skin of the Nemean lion, and memory becomes particular and operational rather than general and relational. Rather than
remembering relational experiences in their general economy, brought forward
to shape present and future relations, we now remember the particular reward
for particular labors well executed. We remember the particular operations of
our labors that secure a desired outcome, and our cultural memory develops
from this restricted economy. We don’t remember the Nemean Lion as he wore
his own skin, and as he came into relation with Heracles. We only remember
Heracles in the operation of his kill, and the yield of his labor, which secured
a desired future—impenetrability in the quest to civilize Athens by ridding her
of beasts, monsters, and the uncivilized Other.
Not only is the mimetic power in a gift economy transfigured by a polis economy, but so too its paratactic power, and again cultural intimacy and
memory suffers. The polis economy figures exchange through a hypotactic
consciousness, not paratactic.5 Hypotaxis figures relations in and through logical
subordination. This logic of subordination is essential to making judgments in
the public sphere on matters of politics, law, and culture, and it exists as well in
archaic culture. The difference is that classical hypotaxis overwhelms exchange
with its demand for subordination. Hypotaxis as the sanctioned style of speech
constrains a general consciousness where subordination can be one of the many
in an aggregate, and cultivates a restricted consciousness where subordination
figures thinking and relating.

Rhetoric-Becoming
The rub between the gift and the polis economies can be generative of rhetoric’s
possibilities. The possibilities, in the positive, of the rhetoric of the polis are
well known, since so much of the history and theory of rhetoric is situated and
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understood only in the context of the polis economy. Yet the polis economy and
its rhetoric can be encountered otherwise when juxtaposed with the gift economy
and its rhetoric. When rhetoric is put in the situation of the polis economy, in
light of the gift, we can suppose a rhetoric operating in an ethic of abstraction,
approaching its situation with a fundamental distance between self and other.
In this distance, the other’s assent becomes regarded as a commodity to secure,
and rhetorical techne the tools for the task. We can suppose technical attention
to operations in the successful design of persuasion transfiguring persons into
things or objects, and in so doing undermining cultural intimacy and cultural
memory, turning the former into fetishism and the later into proceduralism.
We can suppose, too, rhetoric’s utility in structuring citizen relations
through suspicion. Note that ostracization and antidosis are rhetorical situations,
the latter so much so that Isocrates’ Antidosis, an imaginary antidosis fashioned to
protect his wealth of rhetorical teachings from being given over to the suspicion
of the polis, has become a mainstay of education in rhetoric.
Perhaps more than these suppositions, we can suppose a rhetoric wrought
from the polis economy to be a rhetoric of generous competitiveness, and not
competitive generosity. The agonistic impulse of rhetoric in the polis aspires to
win, to conquer, and, in so doing, to establish one’s honor. This kind of honor
is wrought from a spirit of domination, not friendship. We can suppose, then,
the worst case scenario of rhetoric’s effects in a polis economy: Fetishism.
Proceduralism. Suspicion. Domination.
Henry Johnstone did more than suppose such a rhetoric when he wrote
about technology and ethics (1982). He showed such a rhetoric as a logical
consequence of technological process. A process, e.g., rhetoric, is technological
in the sense when it is a series of steps in which either a given step or the project
as a whole determines the sequel to the given step; or else the question whether
the successor is fitting to its predecessors does not arise. In such a process, the
means are determined by the end. A technological procedure is distinct from a
creative process. A creative process consists of a series of steps none of which
is strictly determined by its predecessors but each of which, once taken, is seen
to have been a fitting sequel to its predecessors. One salient feature of a creative
process is that two or more people are cooperating, taking turns to make the step
that is retrospectively seen to be appropriate. A technological process fixes in
advance the relationships among the steps, and requires no cooperation between
those involved in the process to accomplish its task.
Johnstone writes that creative communication occurs only among persons,
and persons require creative communication. The only alternatives to creative
communication are technological communication and no communication at all.
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And technological communication is in fact only an unstable phase of a transition that leads to no communication at all. If I am so exclusively occupying
myself with the procedures for winning a rhetorical position that I end up simply
manipulating my listener in order to win, clearly I am no longer communicating
with my listener. My listener stops being a person to me, and becomes instead a
commodity, a thing abstracted, better yet robbed, from the listener for the benefit
to me. The commodified listener then becomes my fetish, rhetoric the procedure
for feeding it, and brutalization the outcome. If I am surrounded by things and
disconnected from persons, not only do I get no cooperation, but nothing calls
for my own cooperation. There will be no occasion for me to exhibit my own
humanity. Johnstone writes of the probability that under such circumstances a
person could not survive as a person: “His environment would sooner or later
brutalize him. From the role of sole technological manipulator of things around
him, he would pass to the final phase of his degradation; he would become a
thing himself, a thing interacting with other things in a minuet of meaningless
transfers of energy” (48).
When rhetoric is put in touch with the legacies of the gift economy, we
can imagine it not so much as a tool but a gift. We can suppose rhetoric as a
gift to be creative, intimate, memorable, luxurious, and liberal. Creativity is the
antinomy of technical procedure. Intimacy is the absence of commodification and
fetishism. Memory is of general relations or persons, not particular operations
on things. Luxury is surplus of meaning produced. And liberality is a feast-like
expenditure of surplus. However, that the gift is well known to be both remedy
and poison complicates too romantic a view of the gift.6 Gift recipients in a
gift economy can become burdened by the debt of compulsory reciprocity and
obligatory exchange. Moreover, strict lines of exchange tend to be culturally
coded in gift cultures, hence defining and reifying class stratifications. Not just
anyone can give to or receive from just anyone. And that women are wares of
exchange in gift culture offers plenty of caution about romanticizing the gift.
The archaic Homeric gift economy is not our savoir. However, exploring
this archaic economy in contradistinction to the classical polis economy creates
an experience of alterity. This experience becomes generative of new theoretical
directions for rhetoric, so as to get out of the historical trappings of both the gift
and polis economies. In recognizing the radical otherness that the polis is to the
gift, and vice versa, we can resist trading a generative relation of difference for
a deadly regime of domination. If we resist such a trade, we will be given two
incommensurable economies in the study of rhetoric, neither of which should
be the only economy, nor even should both be considered the only two. Instead,
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we can work with the generative relation of difference between (and within) the
two to create something new.
Whereas the gift economy is incommensurable to the polis economy,
they are both economies. This becomes a problem for the gift. We see in the
gift economy a certain kind of savings. The savings of the gift comes in the
form of cultural memory, and while this cultural memory saves obligations to
create solidarity and honor into the future, it also creates permanent cycles of
obligatory reciprocity. Derrida points out that the gift that is recognized as a
gift ceases thereby to be a gift, but an economic exchange. The gift, as Derrida
notes, is figured through antinomy, so that the conditions of its possibility are
precisely its conditions of impossibility (1997, 128). The gift, once recognized,
collapses into a system of exchange. The return to the giver nullifies the act of
giving. As Cixous writes of the ever-presence of economy in history, even the
gift brings in a return (1986, 87).
Mauss never denies the gift’s return; rather, he attempts to calculate the
circulation of the gift under a law of return somewhere between the economic
and the aneconomic. The question becomes whether this return can be denied.
Can the gift be aneconomic? Can we imagine giving, not figured through cycles
of obligatory return, i.e., not savings, but squander; not return, but release?
Both Derrida and Cixous suggest that we can, and both bring this suggestion to bear upon writing, the privileged term for rhetoric in the vocabulary
of these philosophers. Derrida writes of the demand in writing for excess, with
respect to what the writer can understand of what she says. The demand is “that
a sort of opening, play, indetermination be left, signifying hospitality for what
is to come” (2001, 84). Yet “whoever gives hospitality ought to know that she
is not even the proprietor of what she would appear to give” (84). There is no
“I” that ethically makes room for the other in the act of giving, but rather an “I”
structured by the alterity within it. Derrida writes, “The other is in me before me”
(84). The hospitable “I” is itself in a state of self-deconstruction and of dislocation, and from this state writing acts as aneconomic gift of excess meaning.7
Cixous is not so much interested in aneconomic space, but in transfiguring
economy from its masculine to its feminine body. She takes Mauss’s construction of the return of the gift and Derrida’s deconstruction of this return and
inscribes it within the gendered unconscious. The masculine economy of giving
is always associated with debt. The desire to save and to invest so as to receive a
return on one’s investment in the form of increased savings directs a masculine
economy. Cixous suggests we call this economy “masculine” in part because
it is erected from a fear that is typically masculine, namely of expropriation, of
loss. In contrast, feminine economies transfigure return. They are not restricted
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economies where giving is a means of deferred exchange in order to obligate a
counter-gift in return. Rather, giving becomes in a feminine economy an affirmation of generosity that cannot be understood in terms of exchange economies.
Yet, women’s giving does not escape the law of return:
You never give something for nothing. But all the difference lies in the why and
how of the gift, in the values that the gesture of giving affirms, cause to circulate,
in the type of profit the giver draws from the gift and the use to which he or she
puts it. (Cixous 1986, 87)

We can see this feminine economy as an alien within the Homeric gift
economy. In Cixous’s terms, the dominant norms of giving in Homeric gift
economy are masculine. Givers give in expectation of a particular, calculated
return, as when the Phaiakians give such liberal and luxurious departure gifts to
Odysseus, among all the pomp and circumstance of a public hospitality ritual,
in return for his spreading their honor to his home. This scene of gift-giving
stands in stark contrast to the scene of Circe sending off Odysseus. Circe, with
no pomp and circumstance, stocks the ship with the departure gifts of a ram and
black ewe, and she does so without being detected by Odysseus and his men:
“for easily had she passed us by. Who with his eyes could behold a god against
his will, whether going to or fro?” (Od. 573–74).8
This example of Circe’s giving shows that the masculine gender of the
Homeric gift economy is not essential, but yet another accident of history.
Something other is already within the gift. The other is a feminine giving able
to resist the gift that calculates influence.
This escape from calculation of return makes possible Cixous’ feminine
writing. This writing puts the abstracted, autonomous self at risk, bringing the
self into intimate contact with alterity, so intimate that the alterity is already
within. The self recognizes its own radical alterity, and writes from this recognition. This writing is not about saving, or holding in reserve, but sending,
not about return but release. We women, Cixous notes (without excluding men
in her sexual qualifier “women”), do not find our pleasure in “employing the
suitable rhetoric” (92):
indeed, one pays a certain price for the use of a discourse. The logic of communication requires an economy both of signs—of signifiers—and of subjectivity. The
orator is asked to unwind a thin thread, dry and taut. We [women] like uneasiness,
questioning. There is waste in what we say. We need that waste. To write is always to
make allowances for super-abundance and uselessness while slashing the exchange
value that keeps the spoken word on its track. (92–93)
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For Cixous, a feminine economy of the gift is a launching forth and effusion without return. Woman giving doesn’t try to “recover expenses” (87). She
does not have to return to herself: “she is not the being-of-the end (the goal),
but she is how-far-being-reaches” (87). This giving makes possible a feminine
writing that like woman’s cosmic libido can only go on and on, in a paratactic
flow, without ever inscribing or distinguishing contours:
Voice! That, too, is launching forth and effusion without return. Exclamation, cry,
breathlessness, yell, cough, vomit, music. Voice leaves. Voice loses. She leaves.
She loses. And that is how she writes, as one throws a voice—forward into the void.
She goes away, she goes forward, doesn’t turn back to look at her tracks. Pays no
attention to herself. Running break-neck. Contrary to the self-absorbed, masculine
narcissism, making sure of its image, of being seen, of seeing itself, of assembling
its glories, of pocketing itself again. (94)

Such a rhetoric that Derrida and Cixous theorize as writing through giving
requires not investment and savings, but a spending of excess, waste, and surplus.
If rhetoric is not a disposition to invest, then it is an expression of excess.
Henry Johnstone seemed as well aware of this dimension of rhetoric, as he
was of rhetoric’s cathexis. His work on pankoinon attends to the way in which
rhetoric offers surplus meaning. In formal logic, a tautology is an instantiation
of a logical truth such as the Law of Self-Identity (“X=X”) (2000, 7). In rhetoric,
a pankoinon is, as Johnstone writes, a paradox: “it consists in the assertion or
assumption that although a tautology, and thus logically true, it can nevertheless,
have implicatures—one or more of them—the truth or falsity of which does not
depend on logic alone” (2000, 10).
Take, for example, the following definition of rhetoric: rhetoric is rhetoric.
This pankoinon came from a conversation I had with Johnstone about the trouble
with definition, and in particular how this trouble wrecks havoc on rhetorical
scholars asked to define their subject. Johnstone asked why we could not be
content to say, “Rhetoric is rhetoric.” Read as a pankoinon, this definition is quite
evocative. A pankoinon becomes a figure of speech, in part, when it is assumed
that its implicatures need not take the form of an explicitly stateable proposition
(8). What the pankoinon conveys may amount to no more than the sense that
something is being adumbrated that is indefinable, elusive, and mysterious (8).
In pankoinon, we have an open, playful, indeterminate speech, offering surplus
meaning, a giving rhetoric, or a rhetoric giving.
Rhetoric as giving goes beyond meaning that is known or that can be
understood, readily translated, commodified, and exchanged. Such a rhetoric
holds in mind many meanings not for the sake of meaning, not for the sake of
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savings and return, but for the sake of liberal expenditure. A hospitable rhetor
becomes, then, a producer of possibilities rather than a judge of meaning. In
Deleuzian terms, a hospitable rhetor is like Bob Dylan organizing a song: “as
astonishing producer rather than author” (8). To be “no longer an author” but
a “production studio” takes a very lengthy preparation, says Deleuze, yet no
method, nor rules, nor recipes apply (9). The enterprise is a wholly creative one.
The creativity of production has an absolute speed, its does not slow down for
reason’s plan, nor is its line of flight predetermined as a technical process.
Rhetoric as giving enacts a rhetorical hospitality, a sumptuous expenditure of surplus meaning, whether produced by host or guest, speaker or listener.
Such hospitality requires an aggregative consciousness of multiplicity. This
consciousness harkens to Homeric culture, where a paratactic style and the
absence of a “self” have led characters to be called schizophrenic for the many
voices in their heads constituting multiple orientations to their experiences and
the world around them. This schizophrenia allows for meaning to be decentralized, or, in Deleuzian terms, deterritorialized. It gives rise to an encounter, a
becoming, and it operates, as we see in Homeric rhetoric and as Deleuze notes,
in and through “and.”
The power of rhetoric as giving is its power to generate surplus meaning,
a power encountered only in its liberal expenditure. This expenditure, though,
is beyond “exchangist” economic terms, beyond calculated return, beyond
commodification and appropriation. A rhetoric as giving is a rhetoric becoming,
betwixt and between the gift and the polis.
Department of Rhetoric and Communication Studies
University of Richmond

Notes
1. I am indebted to Henry Johnstone for introducing me to Homer. With Dr. Johnstone, I enjoyed
a seven-year reading of the Odyssey in Greek. We began this work as friends, and it lead not only
to my dissertation (The Rhetoric of Deliberation in Homer, Penn State University, 1997), which
Johnstone directed, but to a body of continuing writing, from which the present essay is born.
2. The benefit of experiencing alterity “to resist trading a relation of difference for a regime of
domination” was articulated by Michelle Ballif citing Lynn Worsham in “Rhetorical Gifting of the
Other.” Ballif presented this as a lecture in a course titled “The Gift: Theory, Culture, Language,”
which I taught in spring of 2004 with my colleague Gary Shapiro, Professor of Philosophy, University of Richmond. Diane Davis also presented a lecture to this course, which foreshadowed her
recent publication, “Addressing Alterity: Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Nonappropriate Relation”
(Philosophy and Rhetoric 2005).1 Davis’s distinction between the said and saying resonates with
the distinction between the gift and giving that I will address in this essay.
3. For excellent commentary on Homeric gift culture, see Donlan (1982a, 1982b, 1989, 1993),
Finley (1991), Grant (1988), Murray (1993), Naas (1995), Snodgrass (1990), and Tandy (1997).
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4. For extended critique of the Temple of Hephaestus, and its significance to the polis economy
and rhetoric, see Mifsud, Sutton, and Fox (2005). I am indebted to Jane Sutton for suggesting, in
1997, the significance of this temple. I am indebted to Lindsey Fox for her research on this temple
culminating in her undergraduate honors thesis, “Illuminating a Space for Woman,” Department
of Rhetoric and Communication Studies, University of Richmond, 2004.
5. For Aristotle’s comments on the hypotactic privilege of civic discourse see Art of Rhetoric
1409a.29–1409b.4.
6. See Benveniste (1997) for extended linguistic critique of gift.
7. I am indebted to Ballif, “Rhetorical Gifting of the Other”2 for directing me to this passage in
Derrida.
8. I am grateful to Henry Johnstone for pointing out during our reading the particularly feminine
character of Circe’s giving. Johnstone later gave to me an essay he wrote on this passage during his
graduate work in classics at Bryn Mawr, “Potnia Kirkê” (1977).
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